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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND NON-MARKET
ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) laws 1 are
to be applied in investigations of imports from non-market economy
(NME) countries 2 was the subject of a November 6, 1983 hearing
before the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). 3 Prompted by the
filing of a countervailing duty petition 4 against the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC), these "novel issue" hearings represented the first
time that the DOC has been called upon to evaluate the countervailability of alleged producer subsides in an NME country. 5 The
subsidy alleged in the petition was the PRC's dual exchange rate
system 6 whereby one particular yen conversion rate is offered to
1. U.S. countervailing duty laws are those which levy an import duty on goods from
countries where producer costs are subsidized by the government. The purpose is to restore
free comparative advantage by offsetting the amount of the foreign producer subsidy. U.S.
countervailing duty laws are found at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1980 & Supp. VI 1983).
2. Non-market economy countries are those where the resources for and the means
of production are allocated and put to use through central government planning. Usually
the government claims ownership of most or all such means of production and bases decisions as to what will be produced on pre-determined goals. There is no price mechanism
where supply and demand interact to allocate resources or incentive or disincentive various
production decisions. Typically, non-market economy countries are those in the communist
or eastern block.
3. The hearings were held in Washington, D.C. over the period November 3-4, 1983.
Department of Commerce Docket No. C570-005.
4. The countervailing duty petition against the PRC was filed with the Department
of Commerce pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1980) on behalf of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU),
and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). The imported merchandise in question were textiles, apparel and related _products from the PRC. See Countervailing
Duty Petition of the ATMI, the ACTWU and the ILGWU, Sept. 12, 1983, Department of
Commerce Docket No. C570-005 [hereinafter Countervailing Duty Petition].
5. Prior to the institution of this petition, all countervailing duty investigations had
been related to imports from market economy countries, such as Western European nations.
6. The significance of this practice as a means of subsidizing producer behavior, while
admittedly ambiguous in centrally planned economies, is not totally without merit. While
it is arguable that without a market mechanism which determines a norm against which
subsidies can be granted, there is no subsidy; the dual rate serves as a means of redistributing
profits on import transactions to offset the losses on export transactions. Whether or not
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producers of certain non-export goods 7 and another more generous
rate is offered to producers of goods keyed for export. 8 The keyed
goods in this case were textiles, apparel and related products. 9
The issues presented at the hearing, which was also a part of
the DOC's preliminary finding investigation,10 were framed to reflect
both the novelty of a non-market application of U.S. CVD law, and
the specifics of the PRC case giving rise to that novelty. The first
was whether under U.S. CVD law, 11 bounties or grants may be found
in NME countries, and second, whether dual exchange rates can
confer a subsidy where the entire trade sector is subject to a single
rate and the currency is not convertible. 12
This article offers a summary of the arguments that were
presented to the DOC on the issues recited above. Arguing for the
petitioners were the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the
this is the type of transaction that Congress intended to be countervailable under § 1303,
is the subject of the rest of this discussion.
7. This rate is called the "official rate" and applies to certain limited non-trade transactions, such as tourism, remittances, certain invisibles unrelated to trade and transactions
with such organizations as the IMF. The official rate, pegged to a basket of other foreign
currencies stood at 1.9939 yen to the dollar on May 31, 1983. See Preconference brief of
Walter S. Surrey, Counsel for the National Council for U.S.-China Trade at 15. DOC DKT
No. C570-005.
8. This rate is called the "internal settlement rate" and applies to all foreign trade
transactions, including invisibles related to trade. This higher rate of 2.8 yen to the dollar
was introduced to stimulate PRC exports on January l, 1981. See Countervailing Duty Petition, supra note 4, at 3.
9. U.S. Department of Commerce, Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, Oct. 15, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005.
10. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b), within 85 days after a countervailing duty petition is filed, the Department must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe
or suspect that a subsidy is being provided with respect to the merchandise which is the
subject of the investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (1980).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1980). The text of § 1303(a)(l) is as follows:
Except in the case of an article or merchandise which is the product of a country
under the Agreement (within the meaning of section 1671(b) of this title), whenever
any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow,
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacturer or production
or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, then
upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the country, whether the
same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and
whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when
exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid. in all such cases, in
addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such
bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
12. Department of Commerce, Notice of Conference on Novel Issues, Oct. 5, 1983, DOC
DKT No. C570-005.
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Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. 13 Arguing for the opposition were a mixed group of twenty importers comprised of major
U.S. clothing retailers and trade associations. 14 A brief analysis of
the implications of this debate is offered by way of a conclusion.
Before moving to the arguments themselves, it is important
to note that certain events have taken place since the DOC hearing which have placed the resolution of these issues on hold. These
events, however, are current evidence of the dangerous political
leverage, to be discussed below, inherent in granting domestic producers this novel cause of action against NME producers.
On December 6, 1983, in the wake of strong PRC protests and
warnings, Commerce Secretary Baldrige asked the producers'
association to withdraw the CVD petition in favor of a Presidential initiative to resolve the textile producers' concerns. 14aThe petitioners agreed, and on December 16, 1983, President Reagan announced new, more lenient criteria for triggering the "call"
mechanism whereby imports from communist countries are
restricted under the Trade Act of 1974. 14 h As a condition for
withdrawal, the petitioners were granted and still hold the right
to reintroduce the petition, without prejudice, if the President's initiative proves unsatisfactory. 14c Thus, while the arguments below
are presented as an on-going controversy, they are yet even more
significant because of the implications arising from their
non-resolution.

II. CAN BOUNTIES OR GRANTS BE FOUND IN
NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES?
The phrasing of the question presented above is that which
appeared in the DOC notice announcing the "novel issue" hearing
13. See Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, supra note 9, at 2.
14. See Countervailing Duty Petition, supra note 4, at 14.
14a. On December 6, 1983, Secretary Baldrige convinced the Textile producers to
withdraw the CVD petition and promised to reinstate the investigation if later requested
to by the industry. He further promised that the Department would make an expedited
finding within two working days if the petition were reinstated. 9 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA]
No. 10, at 373 (Dec. 7, 1983).
14b. This "call" procedure is part of the regulations implementing section 406 of the
Trade Act of 1974. Section 406 allows the President to invoke import relief whenever "market
disruption" exists with respect to products imported from Communist countries. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2436 (1980). Market disruption occurs "whenever imports of an article, like or directly
competitive with an article produced by such domestic industry are increased rapidly, either
absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury or threat thereof,
to such domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1980).
14c. Supra, note 14a.
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under discussion in this article. 15 Petitioners, in their preconference
submission however, offered a different version of the question: do
U.S. countervailing duty laws apply to state-controlled economies? 16
While there is no doubt great similarity between these two
questions, 17 the arguments presented by the domestic producers and
the clothing importers are indeed somewhat incongruous. For petitioners, the threshold question is a pure "plain language" question
of statutory construction: do the laws apply? 18 Whereas for the importers, the statutory applicability issue is fundamentally dependent upon the economic reality, to which the statute refers, being
found in NME countries. 19
A.

ARGUMENTS BY THE PETITIONERS 20

The Plain Language of the CVD Statute Requires its Application to Imports from NME Countries.

1.

Interpretation of a statute always begins with the language
of the statute itself. 21 Moreover, unless otherwise defined, words
in a statute should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning. 22
Looking at the CVD statute, petitioners' attention is focused on the
words which state that CVD law applies to "any country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of
government." 23 These words, petitioners conclude, are clear and
unambiguous. The CVD law applies to all countries and makes no
exceptions based on economic preconditions or form of government. 24
15. Department of Commerce, Notice of Conference on Novel Issues, supra note 12.
16. Submission on Behalf of the ATM!, the ACTWU, the ILG WU and the AAMA, Oct.
28, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005.
17. The connection being isolated comes from the language of the CVD statute, 19
U.S.C. § 1303(a)(l) (1980), which reads in pertinent part: "whenever any country ... shall
pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon ...."
18. See Submission on Behalf of the ACTWU, the ILGWU and the AAMA, Oct. 28,
1983, at 1-10. DOC DKT No. C570-005.
19. See Post-conference Brief on Behalf of Kmart Corporation, Nov. 14, 1983 at 2-5,
DOC DKT No. C570-005.
20. See Submission on Behalf of ACTWU, the ILGWU and the AAMA, Oct. 28, 1983,
at 1-10, DOC DKT No. C570-005 [hereinafter Submission by Petitioners].
21. Petitioners cite here G.R. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 986,
990 (1983); Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 4, n.2.
22. Diamond v. Chakrabarby, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Perin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 4, n.4.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(l) (1980).
24. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 5.
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The Legislative History of the CVD Law is Consistent with
its Plain Language.

2.

Citing their own extensive review of the legislative history of
U.S. CVD law, petitioners state that equal application of the law
to both market and non-market economy countries is fully consistent with the statute's intended purpose. 25 The CVD law specifically
acts to prevent domestic producers from being placed in "jeopardy"
by the "unfair competitive advantages" that foreign governments,
either market or NME countries, can provide for exporters through
subsidies. 26 Such subsidies, petitioners point out, are no less
threatening to fair competition because they are levied in nonmarket rather than in market economy countries. 27
3. International Agreements to which the United States is a
Party Reflect an Equal Application of CVD Law to Market and
Non-Market Economy Countries. 28

a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 29
While the PRC is not a party to GATT, 30 petitioners argue that
under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, 31 U.S. trade laws
must not grant state-controlled economy countries exemptions not
granted to free market countries. To do so, they argue, would be
25. The purpose of the CVD law is to redress unfair trade practices that "distort world
trade and discriminate against United States sales." S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
183 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 7186, 7328; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 7, n.10.
26. H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1979); Submission by Petitioners,
supra note 20, at 8, n.11. In this regard, however, petitioners make very limited arguments
to explain or refute strong challenges that NME countries cannot confer subsidies.
27. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 8.
28. While none of the agreements referred to below require U.S. domestic trade laws
to apply equally to all countries without condition, they are offered in support of petitioners'
positions based on an argument of promoting consistency in international practice.
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
30. There are six socialist countries which have joined the GATT: Yugoslavia, Cuba,
Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The PRC, the Soviet Union, East Germany
and Bulgaria are not members.
31. The most-favored-nation principle is a central feature of GATT. It assures each
contracting party that any "advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" respecting "customs
duties and charges of any kind" that is granted by one of their number to any trading partner "shall be immediately and unconditionally" extended to all other contracting parties.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29, Part I, art. 1, para. 1, at A12.
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to violate both the letter and the spirit of the GATT. 32 Such a policy
would not only severely disadvantage our major trading partners,33
but would create an incentive for all NME countries to vigorously
subsidize all exports in order to enhance foreign exchange
earnings. 34

b. GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures
Petitioners look to paragraph 1 of article 15 of the GATT
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidy
Code) as further support for applying U.S. CVD law to imports from
NME countries. 35 Under this agreement, there are express provisions which impose countervailing duties against imports from NME
countries.36 Consistency in international practice, therefore, requires
the United States to do the same.
B. ARGUMENTS BY THE IMPORTERS

The Plain Language of the CVD Statute Applies to an
Economic Reality Nonexistent in NME Countries.
1.

Contrary to petitioners' emphasis on the words "any country"
found in the CVD statute, the importers stress the dependency of
that phrase with the next phrase of the statutory scheme: "[that]
shall pay or bestow ... [a] bounty or grant." 37 Such "grants," the
importers claim, are not found in NME countries. 38 The importers
argue that the CVD law, in concept, is based upon a world in which
free market forces are the norm and is designed to offset aberrations from that norm. 39 In NME countries, however, where market
forces do not determine the allocation of resources for manufacturers, producers or exporters, there is no norm, "as we know it,"
against which aberrations can be measured.4° Such grants, which
32. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 12.
33. On this point see especially the scenario of Pakistan and the PRC presented in
Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 15-17.
34. Id. at 12-13.
35. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 12, 1979, (1979) 31U.S.T.513, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619.
36. Id. at Part IV, art. 15, para. l, at 538.
37. This concept of dependency is found in the Post-Conference Brief on Behalf of Kmart
Corporation, Nov. 3, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 2 (hereinafter Kmart Brief).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 3.
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are by definition ones bestowed in contrast to market allocations,
are nonexistent where there is no market which allocates.'1

There is No Legislative Purpose or History Which Requires
the Application of U.S. CVD Laws to NME Countries.

2.

The importers stress that while there is no specific mention
of NME countries in the CVD law, there is explicit methodology
for dealing with NME countries set forth in the antidumping
legislation 42 and section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.43 Moreover,
while congressional concerns are evident regarding lower priced
NME exports flooding U.S. markets, those concerns are
appropriately addressed only through antidumping and section 406
procedures. 44 Evidence of this is the clear dissatisfaction with then
current trade laws, including the CVD statute, which was expressed
by Congress when NME antidumping and section 406 procedures
were implemented. 45 Whereas no parallel NME procedures were
added to the CVD law, the importers conclude that U.S. CVD law
is simply "inappropriate" for use against imports from NME countries and was not considered "salvagable" by Congress to ever be
so.46

International Agreements to Which the United States is a
Party Do Not Require Blanket Application of U.S. CVD Laws to
NME Countries.
3.

a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 1
According to the importers, it is well established practice under
GATT that contracting parties possess the discretion to treat NME
countries differently from market economy countries. 48 The GATT
itself, in its Notes and Supplemental Provisions, provides for NME
uniqueness through special treatment of imports from such

41. Id. at 4.
42. 19 u.s.c. § 1673 (1980).
43. 19 u.s.c. § 2436 (1980).
44. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 6-7.
45. S.Rep. No. 93-1298 at 210; H.Rep. No. 93-571 at 82; Kmart Brief, supra note 38,
at 7, n.6.
46. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 7.
47. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29.
48. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 12.
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countries.49 U.S. law, the importers stress, takes a similar approach.
In section 406 of the Trade Act of 197 4, there are special provisions which cover only imports from NME countries-even those
entitled to MFN treatment. 50 Under petitioners' approach, if section 406 establishes a different method for achieving relief for nonmarket as opposed to market economy countries, U.S. law must
already violate the MFN principle. This, the importers stress, is
not the case because of the clearly recognized discretion for dealing with NME countries under GATT. Thus, a similarly excepting
U.S. CVD law does not and can not violate U.S. MFN obligations.

b. GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures
The importers argue here that because article 15 of the Subsidy Code clearly contemplates NME trade sanctions only where
domestic injury is alleged, 51 and U.S. CVD law does not, 52 there is
no analogy found in the Subsidy Code for applying U.S. CVD law
to NME countries.53 Moreover, because the injury test required by
the Subsidy Code represents a higher standard of proof for achieving import relief54 than that found in the U.S. CVD law in NME
cases, 55 an application of U.S. CVD law to NME countries would
be both arbitrary and inequitable. 56

49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29, Annex I, art. VI, para.
1, point 2, at A86.
50. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 12.
51. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII,
supra note 35, Part IV, art. 15, para. 1, at 538.
52. Under current CVD law, a material injury test applies to investigations of dutiable
products only from countries which have signed the International Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures or assume similar obligations. See Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra
note 35. Investigations concerning dutiable products from other countries continue to be
conducted pursuant to § 1303 without the necessity of showing injury. No NME countries
are currently party to the Subsidies Code and therefore would require no finding of injury
if U.S. CVD law were to be applied to them. See Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9.
53. Conclusion drawn from Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9.
54. An injury test, paralleled in U.S. trade law, requires the finding that a U.S. industry is materially injured or there is threat thereof, before a CVD can be imposed. 19
U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1980). As defined by § 1677(7), a material injury is harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1980). Thus, an imposition
without such a finding would indeed be easier to implement.
55. See supra note 52.
56. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9.
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III. DOES A DUAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CONFER A
SUBSIDY WHERE THE ENTIRE TRADE SECTOR IS
SUBJECT TO A SINGLE RATE AND THE CURRENCY
IS NOT CONVERTIBLE?
A.

ARGUMENTS BY THE PETITIONERS

1. Legal Precedent Requires an Affirmative Finding that a Dual
Exchange Rate System Does Confer a Subsidy.

Petitioners rely primarily on the 1940 case of F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. United States 57 in which a Treasury Department finding 58 of
a countervailable subsidy based on Germany's nonconvertible dual
rate was upheld by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. While
the facts of the case are complex and the working of the subsidy
is readily distinguishable from the PRC system,59 petitioners stress,
as did the court, that it is the effect of the practice on producer
returns which is dispositive. 60 Like the Woolworth case, the dual
exchange rate in the PRC, "through various devices and through
different authorized government agencies [sought] to aid its
manufacturers in invading foreign markets." 61 Moreover, in both
instances, the currency was non-convertible and the dual rate was
applied to all sectors of export trade. 62 Therefore, as in the German case, petitioners conclude the Chinese system must represent
a subsidy because it also enables producers to sell below world
market prices and still realize more local currency than they would
recover if the transaction had occurred at the official rate. 63

Dual Exchange Rate Systems Possess All the Legal
Characteristics Of a Countervailable Subsidy.

2.

Petitioners characterize a subsidy as a state practice which
constitutes "preferential treatment" for a particular class of
57. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
58. T.D. 49,719, 74 Treas. Dec. 192 (1938); T.D. 48,360, 69 Treas. Dec. 1008 (1936). Prior
to the time the DOC took over administration of U.S. CVD law, the Department of the
Treasury held the responsibility.
59. See Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 20-26.
60. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 23-24.
61. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353.
62. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 348; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 24. The
Woolworth case is silent on the question of whether the German system could be used for
import transactions.
63. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 25.
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persons.64 In determining whether a particular practice qualifies as
a subsidy, petitioners cite four criterion derived from the decisions
of both U.S. courts and administrative agencies. They are: (1) the
economic consequences of the program for producers and
exporters; 65 (2) the economic consequences of the program on
exports;66 (3) the foreign government's intent in establishing the subject program; 67 (4) whether the program acts as a substitute for
another, directly and obviously countervailable subsidy.68 Petitioners
assert that a dual exchange rate program, involving a nonconvertible currency, and applicable to all sectors of trade, may have all
the recognized characteristics of a countervailable subsidy. 69
Applying these criteria to the PRC system, petitioners argue,
the dual yen rate confers an undeniable subsidy on producers.7°For
exporters using the more favorable internal rate, the conversion rate
is approximately 41 percent above the official rate. 71 For all others
who wish to convert, only the lower official rate is available. 72 The
effect on producers is clearly preferential. For exports, the effect
of the dual rate is equally dramatic. In 1981, the year the dual rate
was established, the PRC showed the first positive balance of trade
since 1977.73 Moreover, for the year 1982, that positive balance had
increased over 500 percent. 74 Finally, not only is the dual rate called
a "subsidy rate" by PRC officials, 75 but it was expressly intended
to simplify a number of other subsidies that were used to stimulate
Chinese exports prior to 1981.76 Therefore, according to the standards set by U.S. courts and administrative agencies, the PRC dual
rate qualifies as a countervailable subsidy.
64. Downs v. United States, 113 F. 144, 147 (4th Cir. 1902), affd 187 U.S. 496 (1903);
Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834,838 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983);
Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.38, 39.
65. Industrial Fastners Group, American Importer v. United States, 710 F.2d 1576,
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.40.
66. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1977), affd 437
U.S. 443 (1978); Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.41.
67. Nicholas and Co. v. United States, 7 C.C.P.A. 97, 107 (1916), ajf'd, 249 U.S. 34, 219
(1919). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 27-29, n.37.
68. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 29, n.43.
69. Submission by Petitioner, supra note 20, at 29.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 31.
72. Id.
73. See Countervailing Duty Petition, supra note 4, figure A, at 16.
74. Id.
75. Statement of Wei Yunning, Vice Chairman of the PRC's Foreign Investment Control Commission and the Import-Export Commission, cited in Countervailing Duty Petition,
supra note 4, at 4.
76. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 33.
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3. A Dual Exchange Rate, Where One Rate Applies to the
Entire Trade Sector, is Not Analagous to a Currency Devaluation Nor is It Trade Neutral.

A dual exchange rate system is not a devaluation and, in fact,
is implemented to achieve wholly different objectives than a
devaluation. 77 A system of dual rates, petitioners point out, is used
to isolate the domestic economy from the competitive effects of international cost and price differentials.78 A devaluation, on the other
hand, implies a recognition of international cost and price differentials and is an attempt to equalize them and the associated balance
of payments disequilibrium. 79 Moreover, petitioners stress, evidence
shows that the PRC expressly refused devaluation because of the
potential costs devaluation would have on receipts from tourism
and remittances from overseas.80 Perpetuating a dual exchange rate,
therefore, is clearly in contrast to a devaluation.
On the issue of trade neutrality, a dual exchange rate is a classic
example of trade distortion. 81 Where a trade account exchange rate,
such as the PRC internal rate, is lower than the rate previously
in effect for exports and imports, such a rate acts to promote exports and discourage imports. 82 Such rates are, by definition, export
promotion devices. 83 Not only are they not trade neutral, petitioners
conclude, but they have precisely the same effect as a cash payment on exports, and a surcharge on imports. 84
B. ARGUMENTS BY THE IMPORTERS
1. Legdl Precedent is Consistent with a Finding that the PRC
Dual Rate System Does Not Confer a Subsidy.

The PRC dual rate system applies a single unified rate to all
transactions in China's export/import sector. 85 By contrast, only
when a system grants benefits to specified categories within that
77. Id. at 37.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 37-38.
81. Id. at 39.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 39-40.
85. Post-Conference Statement of the Footwear Group of the American Association
of Exporters and Importers, Nov. 11, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 1 [hereinafter Statement by Footwear Group].
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sector can it amount to a subsidy. 86 This is the rule, the importers
assert, under applicable United States precedent. 87 The PRC single
export rate, therefore, does not confer a subsidy.
Just like the petitioners, the importers cite the 1940 Customs
Court case of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States in support of
the above proposition and their application of it. 88 In Woolworth,
the importers assert, the finding of a countervailable subsidy was
predicated upon a dual rate system in which classes or types of
exports were granted a preferential rate of exchange. 89 For further
support in applying CVD law only in cases of "preferential treatment," the importers look to two administrative decisions, Pork
RindfromMexico, 90 and LambMeatfromNewZealand, 91 where dual
systems were applied to all exports and were not found to confer
subsidies. 92 U.S. legal precedent, therefore, is consistent with a
finding that the PRC dual rate system does not confer a subsidy.
2. No Evidence Exists to Support a Characterization of the PRC
Dual Rate As a Subsidy.

The importers generally agree with petitioners' characterization of a subsidy, as stated above. 93 They conclude, however, that
no evidence exists upon which to base a finding that these criteria
have been fulfilled. 94
In terms of the effect on exporters, because the PRC dual rate
applies a single rate to all trade transactions, the required preferential treatment is not present. 95 Relying on the case of Carlisle Tire
& Rubber Co. v. United States, 953 the importers stress that the term
"subsidy" under the CVD statute does not refer to generally
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 348.
89. Id.; Statement by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3.
90. Pork Rind PeUets from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 39105, 39107 (1983), cited in Statement
by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3.
91. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, 48 Fed. Reg. 58120 (1983), cited in Statement by
Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3.
92. Statement by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69; Post-conference Brief presented by
Counsel Siegel, Mandell & Davidson, P.C., Nov. 14, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 12.
Reference here is to petitioners emphasis on the need for "preferential treatment" to be
part of any characterization of a subsidy under U.S. CVD laws.
94. Statement by Siegel, Mandell & Davidson, supra note 93, at 12.
95. Id. at 12-13.
95a. Carlisle, 564 F . Supp. at 834.
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available benefits, such as a single rate applied to the entire trade
sector. 96 As for the effect on exports, the importers point out that
while there has been an increase in PRC exports, there is no
evidence which links this rise to the dual rate practice. 97 Finally,
the materials presented by petitioners consist of English translations of various Chinese documents which petitioners allege contain the word "subsidy." 98 As a basis for inferring intent, the importers argue that these translations may well be totally out of context to what an official Chinese translation would include. 99 The
Chinese Government, in its statement to the DOC, denies that any
subsidy exists. 100 As long as such conflict continues, the importers
conclude, no determination of intent based on potentially biased
translations can be conclusive. 101
Dual Exchange Rates for Non-Convertible Currencies, Applied
to the Entire Trade Sector, Are No Different Than a Trade
Neutral, General Devaluation.
3.

In non-convertible currency countries, those exporters who
earn foreign exchange in open market transactions have only one
source to redeem that currency for domestic trade: their own central bank. It is this inability to openly convert, and therefore the
access to only one rate at which to convert, which makes the PRC
dual rate trade neutral. 102 Where there is no access, as in the PRC,
for exporters to "reconvert" their admittedly overvalued yen to
dollars at the official market rate, the benefit accrued is an internal one that is not advantageous for future trade transactions. 103 The
result, therefore, is trade neutrality.
Similarly, it is a uniform application of the single rate to the
entire trade sector which also makes the PRC system no different
96. Statement by Seigel, Mandell & Davidson, supra note 93, at 14.
97. Id.
98. Posthearing Brief on Behalf of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and the Association of General
Merchandise Chains, Nov. 15, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 5 (hereinafter statement
by Wal-Mart).
99. Id.
100. See Statement by Spokesman of Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,
Nov. 3, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005.
101. Statement by Wal-Mart, supra note 98, at 5-7. The argument stresses that in this
case of conflicting statements, the "best-evidence" test requiring use of petitioners' evidence
is highly questionable in light of the PRC Minister's Statement.
102. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 14.
103. Id.
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than a general devaluation of the domestic currency .104 Devaluation,
the importers stress, has never been considered countervailable. 105
While devaluations may convey some benefit to the PRC's balance
of payments by making exports cheaper and imports more expensive, the latter effect also increases production costs for countries,
such as the PRC, which rely heavily on imports of capital equipment and raw materials. 106 Overall, in contrast to subsidies, devaluations made for balance of payment reasons are inherently costly .101

IV. ANALYSIS
While the issues presented above are themselves both controversial and challenging, they hold a broader significance in the
overall development of Sino-American trade relations. In the PRC's
trade relations with the West, the complicated range of political
and ideological questions have always made progress contingent
upon careful negotiation and narrowly drawn bilateral agreements. 108
The emergence of a countervailing duty investigation against the
PRC has upset this deliberate course of action and threatens to set
a precedent challenging the stability of future trade relations with
the PRC. 109 As a November 1983 statement by the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade warns, the United States
should "keep in mind the broad spectrum of economic and trade
relations" between the United States and the PRC, and thereby
"handle the [CVD investigation] carefully and properly so that these
relations will not be jeopardized." 110
To the Chinese, a CVD investigation represents more than just
an isolated contest within the general realm of trade relations. From
104. Id. at 14-15.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Treaties in Force, United States Department of State Publication 9285,
Jan. l, 1982, p. 32-33. See also, FRANKLIN D. HOLZMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNDER
COMMUNISUM - POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, 129-32 (1976).
109. The contrast being isolated here is that the delicate balance in trade relations between the United States and the PRC is best met through negotiation at the Executive
level. Trade remedies, such as the CVD, however, can be initiated by Congress or the domestic
industry. They are problematic because they contain no discretionary mechanism by which
their political spillover into other trade areas can be factored into a proper solution. While
a final recommendation may hinge on Presidential enforcement, the process of reaching and
altering those recommendations is arguably too inflexible for the delicate balance accompanying trade relations with the Communist countries.
110. Statement by Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,
Nov. 30, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 2.
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the perspective of Sino-American trade relations, the application
of U.S. CVD law to NME countries doubly handicaps U.S. trade
and political relations with much of the communist world. First,
because of clear economic and social differences between market
and non-market economies, a U.S. CVD investigation signifies not
only a judgment of how the Chinese economy should be run, but
it is a direct attempt to ascribe capitalist values to the socialist
ideology. This, even more than the significance of adding a duty
to Chinese goods, is a direct assertion of U.S. superiority, an assertion inimical to Chinese ideology. A U.S. CVD investigation,
therefore, represents a public attack on the Chinese ideology.
Second, because of the linkages in Chinese trade policy, such as
that currently between agricultural trade and textile trade issues, 111
a President needs unencumbered discretion to negotiate solutions
and either accept or reject the views of domestic industry. 112 As
long as an industry knows it can disrupt relations through the initiation of a CVD investigation, such industries threaten any stable
negotiated balance. 113 Therefore, setting a precedent that industry
initiated U.S. CVD procedures apply to NME countries severely
escalates the level of difficulty in achieving lasting trade policy
objectives with NME countries. 114
A major obstacle in this debate, as in most debates over
statutory construction and legislative history, is that the world has
changed so dramatically since the laws were written. When countervailing duties were first implemented in the Tariff Act of 1897, 115
who would have considered trade from non-market economies to
be a threat to domestic producers? Even if Congress had, given
the ethnocentric obsession of "American" lawmaking, it is hard to
111. Evidence of this linkage within PRC trade policy can be gleaned from Chinese
refusals to purchase American soybeans, man-made fibers, cotton and wheat when the United
States restricted textile imports earlier in 1983 and then delayed in arriving at a new textile agreement to replace that which expired in January 1983. 8 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA]
No. 18, at 678 (Aug. 3, 1983).
112. Reference here is made to use of the President's power to engage in foreign trade
agreements under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1980).
113. Some industry officials, such as Peter Handal, Chairman of the American Association of Exporters and Importers' Textile and Apparel Group, would argue such is the current position of the U.S. textile producers. See 9 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA] No. 11, at 428
(Dec. 14, 1983).
114. The difficulty here is heightened by the fact that Communist countries ascribe
to the President the power to directly influence the outcome of CVD investigations- a power
the President does not possess.
115. What is now 19 U.S.C. § 1303, was originally enacted in 1897 as a part of the Tariff
Act of that year.
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argue that U.S. laws are based on any assumptions except those
to which we ascribe and upon which our own system, economic and
social, is based. Therefore, in determining the congressionally intended scope of U.S. CVD law, in the absence of explicit history,
presumption would favor only those applications to economic
systems with distinct parallels to our own. An application of U.S.
CVD law to NMEs, therefore, is arguably a clear misapplication
of the basic assumptions of countervailability .116

V. CONCLUSION
Having isolated the various areas of contention presented by
this debate, the last point to be made is that the need for concern
is indeed real. While both sides present strong and clearly
articulated arguments, the importers theoretical assertions are of
little political weight when compared to the concrete evidence which
shows that textile imports from the PRC have surged in past
months. 117 While there is no doubt that a full investigation may absolve the Chinese dual system of its alleged countervailability, for
the present, no legal theory is going to stop the political tide that
has arisen against textile imports. 118 As is often the case with novel
applications of the law, the rationality of a legal determination is
worthless when partisanship and special interests have yet to be
heard.

David James Cichanowicz
116. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. See also HOLZMAN, supra note 108, at
38-40.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
118. See especially statements by Senators Moynihan (Nov. 4, 1983) and Thurmond (Nov.
3, 1983) and Governor King of North Carolina (Nov. 4, 1983), DOC DKT No. C570-005.
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